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CONSENT OF STATE AS AFFECTING JURISDICTION
IN MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY
By FRED E. NEEF, of the Denver Bar
HE attempted, now perhaps successful, extension of the
federal bankruptcy power over the political subdivisions

of the states has given rise to much legal controversy.
This controversy has its foundation in the political conception of states rights which, when applied in the field of constitutional law, creates the principle that the powers of the
federal government may not be exercised in such manner as
to interfere with the sovereignty of the states.
When Congress passed the municipal bankruptcy law
in 1934, the cry of interference with state sovereignty was

immediately raised. In the case of Ashton vs. Cameron
County Water Improv. Dist., (80 L. ed. 1309), the Supreme
Court gave heed to the cry and the act was declared unconstitutional in a hotly disputed decision.
Regardless of this ruling, Congress did not feel that assistance under the bankruptcy power to distressed political
subdivisions, was without the pale of its jurisdiction. So
on August 16, 1937, Congress amended the bankruptcy law
and added thereto Chapter X which provided for the composition of the indebtedness of the taxing agency and instrumentalities of the states. Upon a challenge to its constitutionality, this act fared better than its predecessor, and in the
case of United States vs. Bekins (82 L. ed. 75 1), its constitutionality was affirmed.
Growing out of these two laws and the opinions of the
Supreme Court is the interesting question of whether the consent of the state is a condition precedent to the operation of
Chapter X. The majority opinion in the Ashton case adjudicated its immateriality. Justice McReynolds said: "Neither
consent nor submission by the states can enlarge the power
However, in a dissenting opinion written by
of Congress."
Justice Cardozo and concurred in by Chief Justice Hughes
and two other members of the court, the view is expressed
that the act will not disturb the equilibrium between state
and national power; the element of consent being the weight
that preserves the balance. This dissenting opinion of Justice Cardozo becomes of present importance because under the
intimation of the Bekins case, it may become a law.
301
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Before going further with a discussion of these two decisions, let us briefly glance at the provisions of the two laws
and compare them.
As to legislative purpose the laws cannot be identified.
In each an attempt is made to bring the debtor-creditor relationship arising between the individual and the political
subdivision under the control of the bankruptcy court, and
to effect an involuntary impairment of the dissenting creditors
obligation to the end that a composition of indebtedness becomes possible. From many aspects, justice is done.
The
defeat of a fair composition agreement by a selfish minority
cannot be accomplished. A political subdivision stumbling
in a hopeless mire of financial distress, can rehabilitate and
relieve its landowner of impossible tax burdens, free perhaps
to do the same thing over again and accomplish another legalized rape of the investor who seems always attracted like the
moth to the flame. Many other considerations might suggest
sound economic purpose, but this article is not written on that
subject. It suffices to say that the laws have, apparently, a
legitimate purpose.
The laws are closely associated in the matter of procedure. Under both laws the municipality or political subdivision can proceed only on its voluntary petition. Both
require that the petition be filed in good faith, and that the
political subdivision have authority under the laws of the
state to carry out the plan. Chapter IX required acceptance
of the plan by 30 per centum of the creditors in the case of
irrigation, drainage, reclamation, and levee districts, and 51
per cent in case of all other districts, providing, however, that
the 30 per cent clause was not applicable when a loan has
been offered by an agency of the United States. Chapter X
requires that 51 per cent of the creditors of the district shall
approve the filing of the petition and 66 2/3 per cent shall
approve the plan. Under each law, the creditors are given a
right to present the objections at a hearing for such purpose,
and in each case the judge is to approve the plan only if he is
satisfied it has been filed in good faith and is fair to all parties
concerned.
A careful study of the provisions of these laws fails to
reveal, at least substantially, that the latter act invades state
sovereignty less than the former. Both purpose a composi-
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tion of indebtedness; both bring the state agency under the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to accomplish this end,
and both suspend the creditors remedies under the state law
while jurisdiction is retained. The inclusion in the latter
law of provisions requiring the assent of a greater number of
creditors to the filing of the petition and the approval of the
plan would not lessen interference.
In the Bekins case, Chief Justice Hughes distinguishes
the Ashton case by quoting the report of the Senate Committee on Chapter X. This report consists mostly of conclusions. Neither the report nor the opinion specifically point
out wherein Chapter IX offends, and Chapter X fails to offend. Perhaps the committee is right when it says "the bill
here recommended for passage expressly avoids any restriction on the powers of the states or their arms of government
in the exercise of their sovereign rights and duties."
But
the applicability of the statement seems as pointed in relation
to Chapter IX as to Chapter X. The conclusion is warranted that there is as much interference with state sovereignty
in one law as the other. To the writer the differencs are
those of words and not of substance.
With these considerations in mind, let us examine the
opinion of the court in the Bekins case. It should be observed that this case involved a petition under Chapter X of
an irrigation district organized under the laws of California.
Under a statute passed in 1934 by the California legislature,
consent was given to any taxing district in the state to file
the petition mentioned in the "Federal Bankruptcy Statue."
Certain bonholders of the district moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that Chapter X of the bankruptcy act
violated the fifth and tenth amendments to the Constitution
of the United States. The district court held the statute invalid, considering itself bound by the decision in the Ashton
case.
No doubt, in the briefs and arguments of counsel for the
objecting bondholders, the contention was made that the Act
was unconstitutional because it did not expressly require the
consent of the states, and that even though such consent had
actually been given in this case, nevertheless, this express provision was essential to its validity. The court held that an
express provision was nonessential, but implies that the ques-
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tion of whether consent is necessarily an open one.
The
court said: "It is unnecessary to consider the question whether
Chapter X would be valid as applied to the irrigation district
in the absence of the consent of the state which created it, for
the state has given its consent. We think that this sufficiently
appears from the statute of California enacted in 1934."
In a later part of the opinion the court reserves its judgment on the essentiality of consent by resolving the question
for decision in this language:
"We are thus brought to the inquiry whether the exercise of the
federal bankruptcy power in dealing with a composition of the debts
of the irrigation district, upon its voluntary application, and with the
states' consent must be deemed to be an unconstitutional interference
with the essential independence of the state as preserved by the constitution."

In several other instances the Chief Justice indicates the
significance of consent. He says:
"While the instrumentalities of the national government are immune from taxation by a state, the state may tax them if the national
government assents, and by a parity of reasoning the consent of the
state could remove the obstacle to the taxation by the federal government of the state agencies to which the consent applied.
"The bankruptcy power is competent to give relief to debtors in
such plight and, if there is any obstacle to its exercise in the case of
districts organized under the state law, it lies in the right of the state
to oppose federal interference. The state acts in aid, and not in derogation, of its sovereign powers. It invites the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its agency which the state is powerless to rescue.
Through its cooperation with the national government the needed relief is given. We see no ground for the conclusion that the Federal
Constitution, in the interest of state sovereignty, has reduced both
sovereigns to helplessness in such a case."

In this language we must notice the striking similarity
to the dissenting opinion of Justice Cardozo in the Ashton
case. The above analogy of Chief Justice Hughes to the taxing power was also made by Justice Cardozo when he said
"Persuasive analogies tell us that consent will preserve a balance threatened with derangement. A state may not tax the
instrumentalities of the central government. It may do so,
however, if the central government consents." Thus throughout the entire opinion in the Bekins case, Chief Justice Hughes
never seems to escape from the persuasion of the dissenting
opinion in the Ashton case, in which he concurred.
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Notice should be taken of that paragraph of the decision, which indicates that consent is immaterial. It is as
follows:
"Our attention has been called to the difference between Section

80 (k) of Chapter IX, and Section 83 (i) of Chapter X, of the Bankruptcy Act in the omission from the latter of the provision requiring
the approval of the petition by a governmental agency of the State
whenever such approval is necessary by virtue of the local law. We
attach no importance to this omission. It is immaterial, if the consent of the State is not required to make the federal plan effective, and
it is equally immaterial if the consent of the State has been given as we
think it has in this case."
This statement can be reconciled with the language of the case
suggesting the importance of consent. It is easy to believe
that the approval by a governmental agency of the state is unimportant, for that is something far different than consent as
manifest by an act of the State Legislature.
There are those who will argue that the Bekins case
holds specifically that Chapter X is not an interference on
state sovereignty and that the question of consent was foreclosed by the majority opinion in the Ashton case. But why
then does the court say that they do not decide the question
of whether the law would be operative in the absence of the
state's consent? Why do they draw analogy with the tax
cases where the presence or absence of consent absolutely deWhy do they thread
termines the operation of the law?
consent through the theory of practically every other paragraph of the decision? Perhaps the answer is that the court
is laying the foundation for a subsequent pronouncement,
when the question is brought before it in a proper case, that
jurisdiction under the act is dependent upon the state, first
having given its consent. Perhaps the court is intimating
that the Act is effective until the state expresses its disapproval, however, this presupposes a presumption of consent
which would indeed be a violent one. Perhaps these statements are mere dicta which we have misconstrued and the
statement in the Ashton case. is still the law.
The answer appealing most to me is that jurisdiction deGovernmental harmony seems best
pends upon consent.
preserved by allowing the state to decide whether its children
shall run to the bankruptcy court and wash their hands. By
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this alternative, the jealous Guardians of states' rights have
little left to argue about except principle, and the federal government divides the culpability of the action, as some bondholders describe it, with the state legislature.
Whatever may be the merit or lack of merit of the question raised, there is one thing certain, that it is the last possible contention which the bondholders, in states not having a
consent statute, may assert against this legislation.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
BONYNGE, J., on Marriage and Allied Matters.
, New York State Bar Assn., March 10, 1937
Plaintiff wife sought to annul marriage because husband
refused to fulfill his promise to go through with a religious
ceremony after a civil marriage. The plaintiff swore that
there was no cohabitation following the civil rites. The
court, after remarking that the case was one of several similar
qases tried at the January term, observed:
"Such a recrudescence of religious fervor in the present
age tends to tax the credulity of the court. Nor are its doubts
allayed by the extraordinary lack of ardor and curiosity manifested by these young benedicts, or the quite exceptional fortitude and virtue displayed by the females of the species. In a
word, the stories sound fantastic and unbelievable. However, truth is sometimes stranger than fiction, and it may well
be that the nuptial couch has ceased to serve its time-honored
function. In the face of recent warnings, old-fashioned jurists must not permit their antediluvian ideas to impede mankind's headlong progress toward the almost perfect state.
Either they must streamline their ideas or be denied the privilege of earning even so little of their salt as they are said to
merit nowadays. Already beauticians and surgeons are chortling at the profits of face-lifting and glandular operations in
prospect for judges who hope to baffle their eager successors.
Hence if the plaintiff will submit to a physical examination
by a physician to be designated by the court, and his findings
corroborate her claim that the marriage was never consummated, the court will defer to his superior wisdom. Otherwise the complaint will be dismissed." (B. v. B., Sup. Ct.,
Special Term, Pt. V, Kings County, Bonynge, J., Feb. 17,
1937.)

FROM SWIFT vs. TYSON TO ERIE R. R. vs. TOMKINS
NINETY-SIX WEEKS OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY
By WM. F. DOYLE, of the Denver Bar

HE battle which. centered around the thirty-fourth section of the Federal Judiciary Act 1 had its official beginning in the Supreme Court of the United States with the
announcement of the decision in the case of Swift vs. Tyson,

16 Peters 865.
For ninety-six years commentators and judges alike
bemoaned at great length the decision and its effects. For
ninety-six years the decision withstood the onslaught, and
never during all of that time was its authority even slightly
weakened. Then on April 25, 1938, in a surprise decision 2
which was sweeping in effect, the Court completely annihilated
Swift vs. Tyson and all of the hundreds of decisions which had
been supported by it. The opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis
applied the doctrine which had previously been urged by Mr.
Justice Field and Mr. Justice Brandeis in dissenting opinions.
A second ground for the decision was the research of a "competent scholar," the thesis of which was that the legislative
history of Section Thirty-four of the Federal Judiciary Act
proved conclusively that the rule of Swift vs. Tyson was at
variance with the intent of Congress. The case which announced the change was that of Erie R. R. Co. vs. Tomkins,
58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 Law Edition 787 (April, 1938).
In Swift vs. Tyson, action was brought on a bill of
exchange by the holder against the acceptor. A defense of
fraud of the drawer was raised. The issue was whether the
holder who had taken the bill as payment for an antecedent
debt was free from the defense of fraud as a bona fide purchaser for value. There was no statute in New York, and the
decisions were in conflict. Justice Story assumed that under
New York decisions the holder was not a purchaser for value.
The learned Justice then proceeded to disregard this rule. His
decision was that the United States courts were free to decide
questions of general commercial law according to their judgment of what the common law rules were. He ruled that
'Fed. Jud. Act of 1789, 1 Statute at Large 73, 92, Chap. 20, 28 U. S. C. A..
Section 725.
'The question had not been raised by the parties.
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"laws" in Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789' did not
include "within the scope of its meaning the decisions of the
local tribunal," but included only statute laws and "local
usages." Uniformity was the reason of policy assigned for
the decision.
There was a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Catron.
He complained as follows: "I never heard this question
spoken of as belonging to the case until the principal opinion
was presented last evening; and therefore I am not prepared
to give any opinion even was it called for by the record." 4
Vigorous dissent from the rule of Swift vs. Tyson first
appeared in 1845 in Lane vs. Vick." The question was
whether federal courts were bound by the decision of the highest court of the state on the construction of a will. The
majority of the court said no, in accordance with Swift vs.
Tyson. The dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice
McKinley, and concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Taney.
Language used was in part as follows:
"And when Congress defined the powers of the courts of the U.
S., they directed that the laws of the several states should be regarded
as the rules of decision in suits at common law in cases where they apply.
And upon these principles, with few, if any, exceptions, has this court
acted from the commencement of the government down to the present
term of this court. That they should continue so to act is of great importance to the peace and harmony of the United States. If the state
judicial tribunals establish a rule, governing titles to real estate, whether
it arise under statute deed or will, and this court establishes a different
rule, which of these two rules shall prevail? They do not operate like
two equal powers in Physics, one neutralizing the other; but they produce a contest for success, a struggle for victory; and in such a contest it
may easily be foreseen which will prevail."

The learned justice continues to the effect that the contest should be averted by conforming to the rules of property
established by a state and thus he registers his objection to
extension of the doctrine of Swift vs. Tyson to devises of
real estate.
'Which section provides "that the laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply."
'Robert Jackson points out (in an article in 24 A. L. A. Journal) that it is curious that in both Swift-v. Tyson and Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, the dissenting opinions
raise the same objection, namely, that the question was not raised by the case.
'3 Howard 475, 11 L. Ed. 687.

DICTA

309

General law was held to include obligations under contracts entered into and to be performed within a state in the
case of Rowan vs. Runnels, 5 How. 134, 139, 12 L. Ed.
85, 87.
There the Supreme Court's interpretation of a provision of the Mississippi State Constitution conflicted with
that of the highest tribunal of that state. Mr. Justice Daniel,
dissenting, at page 87 of 12 L. Ed., contended that the construction of a state constitution by the state court should be
received and followed by the Supreme Court. He stated that
the decision of the court ran contra to that proposition. He
concluded as follows: "Such a rule of interpretation involves
in my view a contradiction which I am wholly unwilling to
adopt."
The Court in Pease vs. Peck, 18 Howard 595, 599, 15
L. Ed. 518, 520 (1855), conceded that it should adopt the
state court's construction of a state statute, but refused to
change its decision in accordance with a subsequent state decision and thus to "surrender our clear convictions and unbiased
judgment to the authority of the new state decision."
Mr. Justice Campbell in a dissenting opinion retorted as
follows, page 521 of 15 Law Edition:
"The question is so entirely of a domestic character, and belongs
so particularly to the constituted authorities of the state to determine,
that I cannot bring myself to oppose their conclusion on the subject."

Mr. Justice Miller dissented from the application of the
doctrine of Swift vs. Tyson in two instances. First in the
case of Gelpcke vs. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. Ed. 520
(1863), wherein the Court held that it was not bound to
follow a late decision of the Iowa Supreme Court which overruled prior decisions. The Court applied the earlier decisions.
The dissenting opinion reads in part as follows:
"I think I have sustained by this examination of the cases, the
assertion made in the commencement of this opinion, that the court has,
in this case, taken a step in advance of anything theretofore decided by
it on this subject. That advance is in the direction of a usurpation of

the right, which belongs to the state courts, to decide as a finality upon
the construction of state constitutions and state statutes. This invasion
is made in a case where there is no pretense that the constitution, as thus
construed, is any infraction of the laws or Constitution of the United
States."
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A similar protest by Mr. Justice Miller was made to the
decision of the court in the case of Rutz vs. Muscatine, 8
Wall. 575, 585, 19 L. Ed. 490, 494. This opinion was
concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Taney.
The dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Field and Mr.
Justice Holmes were much more vigorous.
In the case of Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. vs. Baugh,

149 U. S. 368, 390, 37 L. Ed. 772, 782, 13 Sup. Ct. 914,
the Court applied the doctrine to a case of liability for a tort
committed within the state upon persons resident therein. The
Court further declared that the thirty-fourh section of the
judiciary act applied only to positive state statutes and their
construction.
Justice Field dissented on the ground that the doctrine
was an unconstitutional federal invasion of the state in that
the federal court in applying the doctrine was in fact governing within the state matters which belonged to the state, and
thus there was a usurpation of power.' The intensity of the
justice's emotions on the subject can be seen from reading
some of his words (page 401 of 149 U. S.) :
"I admit that learned judges have fallen into the habit of repeating this doctrine as a convenient mode of brushing aside the law of a
state in conflict with their views."

Again, at page 403:
"I cannot permit myself to believe that any such conclusion, when
more fully examined, will ultimately be sustained by this court. I have
an abiding faith that this, like other errors, will, in the end, 'die among
its worshippers'."

The first of Mr. Justice Holmes' dissents on the point is
found in the case of Kuhn vs. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S.

349, 370, 54 L. Ed. 228, 238, 30 Sup. Ct. 140. There the
opinion of the Court extended to a situation involving title
to real property. It was because of this feature of the case
that Mr. Justice Holmes objected.
His opinion reads in part as follows:
"This is a question of title to real estate. * * *
"I admit that plenty of language can be found in the earlier deci'One of the supporting props used by the Supreme Court in the Erie R. R. case.
supra, is the concept of the "unconstitutionality of the course pursued" as thus expounded by Mr. Justice Field.
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sions to support the present decision. That is not surprising in view of
the uncertainty and vacillation of the theory upon which Swift v.
Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865, and the later extensions of its doctrine, have proceeded.

*

*

*

"If, as I believe, my reasoning is correct, it justifies our stopping
when we come to a kind of case that, by nature and necessity, is peculiarly local, and one as to which the latest intimations, and, indeed,
decisions, of this court are wholly in accord with what I think to be
sound law."

It would seem that the objection of Justice Holmes was
to the extension of the doctrine.
Mr. Justice Holmes went further in the Taxicab case."
There a Kentucky corporation incorporated in Tennessee and
made a contract in Tennessee with a railroad which was also
a Kentucky corporation, providing for exclusive patronage.
Such a contract was not valid in Kentucky. Nevertheless, the
Federal Court recognized it as valid and issued an injunction
prohibiting a rival Kentucky corporation from competing.
The Supreme Court upheld this decision.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes was to the
effect that the Court had acted unconstitutionally.
"But the question is important and in my opinion has been accepted upon a subtle fallacy that never has been analyzed. If I am right,
the fallacy has resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of powers by
the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion
should make us hesitate to correct.""

Actually, according to Justice Holmes, there is no such
isaugust corpus." The common law exists within a state by
virtue of the authority of that state, "and if that be so, the
voice adopted by the state as its own' should utter the last
word."
Commentators have contributed much on both sides of
the question. There has been considerable criticism since the
'Black and White Taxicab F3 Transfer Co., Petitioner, v, Brown and Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 532, 72 L. Ed. 681, 686, 48 Sup. Ct.
404. 57 A. L. R. 426.
'Justice Holmes then points out that the fallacy of the doctrine is that it assumes
that there is a transcendental body of law outside of any particular state but obligatory
within it unless and until changed by statute; that federal courts have the power to use
their judgment as to what the rules of common law are; and that in the federal courts
"the parties are entitled to an independent judgment on matters of general law."
'Whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court.
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decision in the Taxicab case.' ° This can be explained on the
ground that that case clearly demonstrated possible abuses of
the doctrine of Swift vs. Tyson. It was clearly shown that
corporation litigants could use federal courts for the express
purpose of avoiding a state decision which was unfavorable.
Much also has been written in defense of the doctrine."
John Chipman Gray" contended that the decision in the
case of Swift vs. Tyson was explainable in terms of the personality of Mr. Justice Story. Gray felt that Mr. Justice
Story was influenced by his restless vanity, his fondness of
"glittering generalities," his reputation for "great learning"
and by the fact that "he was occupied at the time in writing
a book on bills of exchange." That Mr. Justice Story also
was influenced by the desire for uniformity in the law of bills
and notes was unquestioned. This is demonstrated by the
following language from Swift vs. Tyson:
"The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared
in the language of Cicero, * * * not the law of a single country only,
but of the commercial world. Non erit lex Rornae, alia Athenis, aia
nunc, alia posthac, set et apud ornnes gentes, et omni ternpore, una
eademque lex obtenebit."

This concept has of course been carried out in the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law.
The greatest single contribution made on the subject
was that of Charles Warren in his article, New Light on the
"See Shelton, Concurrent Jurisdiction-Its Necessity and its Dangers (1928), 15
Va. L. Rev. 137; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between Federal and
State Courts (1928), 13 Corn. L. 2, 499, 524-30; Johnson, State Law and the
Federal Courts (1929), 17 Ky. L. J. 355; Fordham, The Federal Courts and the
Construction of Uniform State Laws (1929), 7 N. C. L. Rev. 423; Dobie, Seven
Implications of Swift v. Tyson (1930), 16 Va. L. Rev. 225; Dawson, Conflict of
Decisions Between State and Federal Courts in Kentucky, and the Remedy (1931), 20
Ky. L. J. 1; Campbell, Is Swift v. Tyson an Argument for or Against Abolishing
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction (1932), 18 A. B. A. J. 809; Ball, Revision of
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction (1933). 28 Ill. L. Rev. 356, 362-64; Fordham, Swift
v. Tyson and the Construction of State Statutes (1935), 41 W. Va. L. 2,131.
'Eliot, The Common Law of the Federal Courts (1902), 36 Am. L. Rev. 498,
523-25: A. B. Parker, The Common Law Jurisdiction of the United States Courts
(1907), 17 Yale L. J. 1: Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made
State Law in State and Federal Courts (1910), 4 I11.
L. Rev. 533; Brown. The
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citizenship (1929), 78 U. of
Pa. L. Review 179, 189, 191; J. J. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent
Attacks Upon It (1932), 18 A. B. A. J. 433, 438; Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts in Controversies Between Citizens of Different States (1933), 19 A.
B. A. 5J. 71. 74, 75.
" Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd ed.), page 223.
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History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923), 37
Harvard Law Review, 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108.13
Warren's research consisted of a study of the legislative
history of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act. His findings
established that there was very definitely an issue in Congress as to whether "laws" should mean statute laws merely,
or should include general law. In an original bill the word
"statute" was struck out, leaving the word "laws."
This
would indicate that it was the intention of Congress to require
the Federal courts to follow all state laws including judicial
decisions, except where the constitution or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise provide. Therefore, if Warren
was right, the interpretation of Section 34 by the Supreme
Court in Swift vs. Tyson was not in accord with the intention of Congress.
Erie R. R. Co. vs. Tomkins, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed.
Advance Sheets 787, supra, was a personal injury case. Its
facts are not now important. The trial court in accordance
with the then rule ignored the law of Pennsylvania on the
subject. The law of Pennsylvania would have precluded recovery. The railroad company "contended that application
of the Pennsylvania rule was required, among other things,
by Section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24,
1789, Chapter 20, 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 725, * * *"
Justice Brandeis wasted no words in stating the issue
(82 L. Ed. 787):
"This work is recognized by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Tomkins case, supra:
"Doubt was repeatedly expressed as to the correctness of the construction given Section
34 (citing Pepper, The Border Land of Federal and State Decisions (1889). 57;
Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law (1909 ed.), Sections 533-34; Trickett, NonFederal Law Administered in Federal Courts (1906), 40 Am. L. Rev. 819, 821-824).
and as to the soundness of the rule which it introduced (citing Street, Is There a General Commercial Law of the United States (1873), 21 Am. L. Reg. 473; Hornblower, Conflict Between State and Federal Decisions (1880), 14 Am. L. Rev. 211:
Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of State Law (1882), 8 So. L.
Rev. (N. S.) 452, (1911), 45 Am. L. Rev. 47; Heiskell, Conflict Between Federal
and State Decisions (1882), 16 Am. L. Rev. 743: Rand, Swift v. Tyson versus
Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1895), 8 Harvard L. Rev. 328, 341-43; Meils, Should Federal
Courts Ignore State Laws (1900), 34 Am. L. Rev. 51: Carpenter, Court Decisions
But it was
and the Common Law (1917), 17 Columbia L. Rev. 593, 602-03.)
the more recent research of a competent scholar, who examined the original document,
which established that the construction given to it by the court was erroneous: and
that the purpose of the section was merely to make certain that, in all matters except
those in which some federal law is controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction
in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as their rules of decision the law of the
state, unwritten as well as written."
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"The question for decision is whether the oft-challenged doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved."

The Court first declares that the statutory construction
in Swift vs. Tyson was erroneous.
The opinion points out that experience in applying the
doctrine has "revealed its defects, political and social; that it
failed to bring about uniformity, in fact uncertainty was increased. Further, that it brought about discrimination in
favor of those who could use the federal courts. "Thus the
doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law."
"Swift vs. Tyson introduced grave discriminations by citizens against non-citizens."
General law was given a broad province. In fact, it was
extended to all kinds of matters, both national and local.
As a further reason for the decision, Justice Brandeis
states that "The unconstitutionality of the course pursued has
now been made clear and compels us to do so.1 "

The course is unconstitutional because there is no "federal general common law." Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state. Nor
can the courts do so. The common law exists only by virtue
of the sovereignty of the state within which it is declared. The
common law does not consist of a "transcendental body of
law outside of any particular state, but obligatory within it
unless and until changed by statute."
"Thus the doctrine of Swift vs. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice
Holmes said, 'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by
courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.' In
disapproving that doctrine we do not hold unconstitutional
Section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other
Act of Congress. We merely declare that in applying the
doctrine this court and the lower courts have invaded rights
which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the
several states."
The chief criticism urged by Mr. Justice Butler in his
dissenting opinion (concurred in by Mr. Justice McRaynolds)
is that the constitutional question was not "suggested or
argued below or here." He points out that the court has
"'"Toabandon a doctrine so widely applied tbroughout nearly a century."
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''often emphasized its reluctance to consider constitutional
questions." According to Justice Butler, the case could have
been decided on another ground..
In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Reed registered his
disapproval of the act of the court in adopting the constitutional ground. Justice Reed felt that the decision could have
been made on the issue of statutory construction. "It seems
preferable to overturn an established construction of an act
of Congress, rather than in the circumstances of this case, to
interpret the Constitution."
The effects of the Tompkins case will be far-reaching.
The most important result of the decision will be a greatly
decreased docket in the federal courts. Also, the decision will
give rise to new problems. Some of these are set out in a very
recent article."5 The authors suggest the following:
"(1)
A line must be drawn between substance and procedure.
As to the latter the national courts are now governed by their own rules.

(2)

What will happen to the repudiation cases such as Gelpckes v.

Dubuque? (3)
What will determine which state's substantive law
will be applied by the national courts? (4) Will the march of conformity to state law be completed in equity?"' 1

To this writer the most interesting aspect of the subject
is the extraordinary phenomenon that it presents from the
standpoint of the judicial process. An extremely controversial
decision is attacked on all sides by judge and writer alike.
Despite these continuous assaults it becomes increasingly
strong, vital and extensive. At last, with one tremendous
sweep, it is wiped out completely. Moreover, we find the
hopeful prophecy of Mr. Justice Field come to pass. It has,
in the end, "died among its worshippers."
"The collapse of "General Law in The Federal Courts, Charles T. McCormick
and Elvin Hall Hewins, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 126.
"This question has been answered by the subsequent Supreme Court case of
Rublin v. New York Life Insurance Co., 82 Law Edition Advance Sheets 823.
1
'B. V 0. R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 369, 403.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION
FairLabor Standards Act (Wage-Hour Law)
Wage Orders Without Basis in Record.
New York State Bar Assn., Oct. 12, 1938
The first series of rules and regulations under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (Wage-Hour Law), relating to Industry Committees, was issued by the Administrator on September 22, 1938. They contain a most amazing section (Sec.
12) providing that an Industry Committee "shall not be required to keep a stenographic transcript of any testimony
that may be given before it or of its discussions."
In view
of such want of a record it is difficult to see how an Industry
Committee can constitutionally perform its duties under the
Act or how a wage order could constitutionally be issued on
the basis of any Committee recommendation.
Section 8 (b) of the Act requires each Industry Committee to hear such witnesses and receive such evidence as may
be necessary or appropriate to enable the Committee to recommend the highest minimum wage which the Committee determines, having due regard to economic and competitive conditions, will not substantially curtail employment in such industry. Furthermore, any classifications within an industry for wage-fixing purposes must be made by the Committee
according to certain standards set forth in the Act. Finally,
the Administrator, upon receiving the recommendations from
an Industry Committee, is required to hold a hearing and to
approve the Committee recommendations, "if he finds that
the recommendations are made in accordance with law, are
supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing, and, taking
into consideration the same factors as are required to be considered by the industry committee, will carry out the purposes
of this section."
It is submitted that recommendations by an Industry
Committee with no record to support them, followed by administrative orders based on such recommendations without
the existence of means for the Administrator to compare the
evidence at his hearing with the evidence introduced before
the Industry Committee, would necessarily have no legal force
whatever.
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OLD AGE FUND
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
Attention to the Old Age Fund was last invited on May
15, 1937.
Since then two very deserving cases came to our attention, which threatened greatly to deplete or wipe out our
balance but which were finally otherwise taken care of. One
or two members knew of these probable demands and offered
to respond to a call if additional funds became necessary.
To avoid an urgent call or "drive" for funds was one of
the purposes of establishing this Fund. Formerly when cases
of dire need arose they were overlooked or neglected unless
some friend made a hurried and sometimes unseemly scramble
for funds among the few who could be reached quickly.
These embarrassing situations should be and will be
avoided if our members continue to make small contributions
annually or substantial ones occasionally.
Contributions have varied from one to one hundred
dollars, and each contributor is requested to remit to the
Treasurer.
EDWARD RING,

WILLIAM E. HUTTON,
WILBUR F. DENIOUS,

Trustees.

Dated December 5, 1938.

WANT SOME NEW FALSE TEETH?
False teeth are personalty while in the owner's pocket, but they
are part of the owner's body when in his mouth!
So a Los Angeles Appellate Court ruled in a suit brought by a
film actor to collect on a personal property insurance policy. The teeth
had been lost from his pocket.

JUSTICE BLACK
By Brandenberg & Brandenberg
Whatever else may be said of Justice Black, it certainly may be said
he can perform a "stunt."
In Advance Sheets, Supreme Court, Vol.
83, No. 2, p. 37, he said "The cause is reversed;" and again, ditto,
p. 66, "And the cause is reversed."
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Supreme Court Decisions
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-WARRANTS-Town

of Morrison, et al.

vs. Burke-No. 14395-Decided October 17, 1938-District
Court of Jefferson County-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, JudgeAffirmed. EN BANC.
FACTS: Suit brought on a warrant of the town of Morrison. The
town's principal defense is that there was no compliance with sections
199 and 200, Chapter 163, 1935 C. S. A., pertaining to the method and
extent of appropriations for necessary expenses and liabilities.
HELD: The burden of sustaining an affirmative defense is on the
defendant town urging it.
2. The presumption is that public officials conduct their affairs in
a legal manner, and that presumption exists as to the validity of the warrant; the evidence submitted by the town to show that the authority for
the issuance of the original warrant was never given is not convincing.
3. If the officer has properly received moneys, but has improperly
and wrongfully paid them out, he cannot in the eyes of the law answer
that they are not in his possession.
4. Where it is once determined that the town treasurer is conclusively presumed to have sufficient money, Section 219, Chapter 163, Vol.
4, 1935 C. S. A., imposes a clear legal duty on him to pay the warrant.
5. "Section 342 of the Code provides: 'The writ of mandamus
may be issued * * * to compel the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station * * *'"
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-Frink vs. People-No. 14410-Decided

October 17, 1938-District Court of Alamosa County-Hon.
John I. Palmer,Judge--Judgmentaffirmed as to guilt, but reversed
and remanded as to sentence. EN BANC.
HELD: 1. Where defendant is found guilty of larceny of an unbranded colt, upon which the jury placed a valuation of $5.00, and
sentenced to serve a period of from two to four years in the penitentiary,
the court erred in its sentence, for it should have been based upon a verdict
of petit larceny, since the value of the colt was not more than $20.00.
2. Larceny of livestock under either Section 33, Chapter 160,
Vol. 4, C. L., Sec. 3149 or Sec. 93 of Chapter 48, Vol. 2, 1935 C. S. A.
is a felony, subjecting anyone convicted thereof to sentence to the penitentiary; and that for the purpose of prosecution under either, they are in
pan materia, and no allegation and proof of value is necessary.
3. But such provisions are not exclusive of the general larceny
statute (Sec. 85, Chapter 48, Vol. 2, 1935 C. S. A.) and where the Dis-
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trict Attorney injects the question of value and introduces evidence in
relation thereto, he has elected to try it as petit larceny.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
CRIMINAL LAW-GAMBLING-INTENT-JOINT TRIAL-EVIDENCE

-Wilson, et al. vs. People-No. 14381-Decided October 17,
1938-DistrictCourt of Arapahoe County-Hon. S. W. Johnson,
Judge-Affirmed. EN BANC.

HELD: 1. A count in an information is sufficient where it alleges
that the defendants were in the habit and practice of gambling for a
livelihood, and it is immaterial whether or not it is alleged that they
were without a fixed residence. Gambling for a livelihood is a violation
of the statute irrespective of the question of residence.
2. There is no merit in the contention that defendants may not
be tried jointly for engaging in gambling for a livelihood. So engaging
is not necessarily for a personal or individual purpose; although intent,
in crimes where that is an ingredient, is personal and individual.
3. Evidence examined and found sufficient to support count that
defendants had played at a game.
4. Betting on horse racing constitutes a "game" within the meaning of the statute.
5. The action of playing a game with the aim of gain is the gist
of the offense and it is immaterial whether the defendants played against
each other or with each other against others.
6. It is the general rule that where the means by which a crime
may be committed are set forth in the statute in the disjunctive, they
should be alleged in the information in the conjunctive; but the rule is
not applicable here because it is clear that the purpose of the statute is
to interdict the playing of a game for gain, and the words "money or
other property of value" comprehend nothing more than the playing
of a game for property of all kinds.
7. It was not error for the trial court to permit the jury to take to
their jury room, over objection of defendants, a bushel basket full of
papers found in the defendants' room at the time of the arrest. The reasons assigned for the rule at common law, permitting the jury to take
to the jury room papers under seal and not those unsealed, had ceased
when Colorado became a political entity, and, therefore, was not a part
of the common law which was incorporated into our system of criminal
jurisprudence.
8. It was not error for the trial court to admit the testimony of
one to a former arrest of one of the defendants and as to his plea of
guilty of conducting a gambling house when arrested under circumstances
similar to those in the instant case. Gambling for a livelihood was one
of the charges; and from the very nature of that offense it is a continuing
one and may and usually does involve many separate acts.
9. There are certain things such as trafisactions on stock exchanges, matters on which men act in weighty affairs of life, that are so
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generally accepted that one having knowledge of them derived through
the ordinarily relied upon avenues of information may testify concerning
them.
10. "While the jury could draw no inference of guilt from" the
failure of defendants to take the stand, "if the record discloses, as this
,one does, facts consistent with guilt without explanation or denial by
those who knew best what they were doing--defendants themselvesthey cannot complain of an adverse verdict and judgment" supported by
'sufficient competent evidence.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-STATE CONTRACTS--Smith-Brooks Printing Co., et a(. vs. Young, et al.No. 14433-Decided November 18, 1938-District Court of
Denver-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed. EN BANC.
HELD:
1. "When words having different but well recognized
shades of meaning are used in a statute they should be given that shade
of meaning that makes the statute reasonable and brings it within the
constitutional powers of the legislature to enact it."
2. The general assembly may not delegate the power to make a
law, but it may delegate power to determine some fact or a state of
things upon which the law, as prescribed, depends.
3. The laws of this State require that while prior general compliance with prevailing standards of working hours and conditions in
the conduct of its private business is not a condition precedent to the
right to bid on state printing, compliance with such standard in carrying out the contract is requisite to a lawful and full performance of
any such contract entered into with the State.
4. The legislature may authorize the Industrial Commission to
determine what the prevailing wages, hours of work and working conditions in the printing business are, and the words "fixed and prescribed by the industrial commission," are construed to mean "found
and determined by the industrial commission."
5. The State has the right to determine and set the rules under
which one seeking to do work for it must operate.
6. It is not necessary that the same rules and regulations be made
to apply to all industries for while a state has the power to prescribe
regulation for more than one industry, this does not invalidate its
regulation of one to the exclusion of another non-competitive industry.
7. Section 7, Chapter 214, S. L. 1937 (Sec. 72, Chapter 130,
1935 C. S. A.-1937 Supplement) is in harmony with and not repugnant to section 29 of Article V of the Constitution.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Burke dissenting in part. Mr. Justice Holland not participating.
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NEGLIGENCE-SIDEWALKS-DUTY TO KEEP SAFE--CITY-GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY - DAMAGES - NEW TRIAL-EVIDENCE-

Be[caro Realty Inv. Co., et al. vs. Norton-No. 14178-Decided November 7, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. Otto
Bock, Judge-Affirmed. EN BANC.
FACTS:
This is an action for $30,000 damages grounded on
negligence, brought by Norton against the Belcaro Inv. Co. and the
City and County of Denver. Defendants seek reversal of a judgment
against them in the sum of $6,250.00.
Mrs. Norton was standing at the curb waiting for a bus. Directly
behind her was a rectangular depression some four feet in size and five
inches deep with an elm tree in the center. It had been the desire of
the City to preserve this elm tree. As Mrs. Norton stepped back
from the curb line away from the approaching bus, she stepped into
this depression, lost her balance and fell against the projecting edge of
the walk, thereby sustaining permanent injuries. The Realty company was the owner of the abutting property.
1. Both the owner of the abutting lot and the City
HELD:
are under a common obligation to keep safe the sidewalk in front of
such lot. If the plaintiff is injured by their failure in this respect,
which failure would be a common neglect of duty, the plaintiff would
have his election to sue the defendants jointly or severally.
2. It is within the power of the jury to decide whether or not
a City was acting in a governmental capacity, and evidence to the effect
that the City was pursuing a policy to make it a "City beautiful"
is admissible.
3.
It is only when the reason for setting aside the verdict relates
solely to damages disassociated from every other contributing, related
or vitiating cause that the new trial should be limited to the question
of the amount of damages.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Holland not participating.
Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
LEASE AND OPTIONS-EVIDENCE-ABILITY TO PAY-Cline vs. Estate
of Heron-No. 14312-Decided November 7, 1938-District
Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed. EN BANC.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, sued for an
accounting, and specific performance of a contract to purchase certain
lands and a house, under an alleged option in a lease. Judgment was
entered in favor of the defendants on their cross complaint, and for
damages in the sum of $3,200.00. This case involves the construction
of paragraph eight of a lease, to wit: "Lessee shall have the right and
option to purchase said property on or before July 10, 1936, by paying to the lessor in cash an amount representing the actual cash investment of the lessor, including principal, accrued interest and taxes or
other items paid by the lessor, including interest on above at the rate
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of 5 % per annum; lessee to receive as credits monies paid, to lessor as
rents from this property, provided he exercises his rights under this
option. Said option must be fully complied with as to all properties
herein described, a partial purchase not being permissible hereunder."
The lease was extended to August 15, 1937. On August 12, 1937,
Cline sent "Notice of exercise of option" to Mrs. Heron, executrix of
the estate of the original lessor.
HELD:
1. Extension of the lease to August 15, 1937, also
extended the option to the same date.
2. The finding of the trial Court that plaintiff had failed to
comply with the terms of the option, was supported by sufficient competent evidence, and will not be set aside.
3. It is obvious from the language used that the giving of credits
Therefore, a major issue was
was to be a condition subsequent.
plaintiff's ability to pay at the expiration date.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Holland did not
participate.
ESTATEs-ADMINISTRATORS---COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS--SETTING
ASIDE OF-EVIDENCE-Estate of Shultz us. Hyssong, et al.-No.
14303-Decided November 7, 1938--County Court of El Paso
County-Hon. Hubert Glover, Judge-Affirmed. EN BANC.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error, Wlliam R. Shultz, as administrator
of the estate of his deceased son Glenn, is here asking the Court to
reverse a judgment rendered by the County Court of El Paso County
whreby it refused to set aside the compromise of a claim against the
estate. Glenn Shultz died intestate on February 10, 1936, leaving as
his sole surviving heirs, his mother, and his father, the said William R.
Shultz. In 1932, Glenn had caused to be incorporated the Glenn
Shultz Auto Supply Company. Its stock was issued as follows: to
Glenn Shultz, 9,998 shares; to Ray Mervine, 19,501; and to Harry
Hyssong, 120,501. All this stock was claimed by the administrator
as the property of the intestate. A contract was agreed upon by William R. Shultz, as administrator, by Mervine and Hyssong, by the
attorneys of all three, and by the attorney for Glenn's mother. Thereunder Mervine and Hyssong would receive the stock standing in Glenn
The contract was submitShultz's name upon payment of $12,500.
ted to the County Court for approval and was duly approved. Subsequently, the administrator filed a petition seeking to have the contract
set aside, the ground alleged being that the contract had been executed
while the petitioner was "sick and enfeebled in body and mind, and not
understanding the terms, conditions and provisions thereof, and not
The
being represented by counsel to explain the entire effect thereof."
Court dismissed the petition.
HELD:
1. Even if the order approving the contract was made
without testimony and if evidence were required, the stipulation between the parties would be deemed its equivalent.
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2. Shultz cannot avail himself of any technical defect whereof
he may have been guilty.
3. Shultz cannot raise the question that the contract was contrary
to the statutes of Colorado, because he brought about the situation of
which he complains.
4. Shultz cannot now personally profit by any dereliction of his
as administrator, when his own contract thus affects only the rights of
himself and those of his consenting coheir.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Holland not participating.

TRUSTS--SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS-Newell vs. Tubbs, et al.-No.
14418-Decided November 21, 1938-District Court of Denver
-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed. IN DEPARTMENT.
FACTS: B died testate providing in his will, among other provisions, as follows: "All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate
shall be converted into cash and invested in income producing securities approved by law for savings banks and for investment of the funds
of estates, the said income to be proportionately used for the education
of my great-grandchildren, the principal to be divided among said greatgrandchildren, share and share alike, when the youngest great-grandchild, now living, shall have attained the age of twenty-one years.
N, one of the great-granchildren of B, was one of the beneficiaries
under the trust. He assigned his interest, for valuable consideration,
in 1934, to T and S. Later in 1934, N and his wife executed and
delivered to T and S a further formal release in which they acknowledged that their attorney had fully explained all of their right and
liabilities arising out of the transaction.
N now brings suit seeking a decree annulling and cancelling the
assignment and for an accounting, claiming the trust to be a spendthrift trust, and therefore, not assignable.
HELD:
1. The language used did not create a spendthrift trust.
It is only by the use of language similar in meaning and legal import to
that contained in the document under consideration in the recent case
of Snyder v. O'Connor, 102 Colo. 567, 81 P. (2nd) 773, that such
a trust may be established.
2. " 'A spendthrift trust is the trust created with provisions in
the trust instrument to the effect that the beneficiary shall not alienate
the equitable interests or that it shall be free from its creditors.' "
3. "Clear and unequivocal language is necessary to create such
a trust or, in the absence of such language, the intention to create must
clearly appear from the language of the entire instrument."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr.. Justice Holland concur.
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CONTRACTS AGENCY - GRATUITY WITNESS - EVIDENCE INSTRUCTIONS-Cohen Sons, Inc., vs. Dowd-No. 14294Decided November 21, 1938-District Court of Conejos County
-Hon.
John I. Palmer, Judge-Affirmed. IN DEPARTMENT.
FACTS: Plaintiff sued defendant for $3,000.00 on a promissory
note.
The defendant in his answer set up a counterclaim, based upon
the alleged breach of a contract between the parties and asking $3,000.00
damages. The contract was one wherein plaintiff was to act as agent
for defendant in the sale of vegetables grown by defendant. By the
contract, plaintiff loaned defendant $1,500.00 to be repaid, without
interest, at the rate of $100.00 out of the proceeds of each and every
car of vegetables sold by plaintiff for defendant.
The defendant contended that the contract was breached by plaintiff's agent, R, in giving
him false information, from day to day, concerning the markets, which
plaintiff knew to be false, and that such information was given for the
purpose of persuading defendant to act thereon in order that plaintiff
might collect commissions on the sales of vegetables purchased by defendant.
The jury found the issues for the defendant and offset the
amount of the note by the amount of the damages.
HELD:
1.
" 'An agent, engaged in an employment which requires special or professional skill, will be liable for losses due to his
failure to possess and exercise such skill, where the agent professes and
holds himself out as possessing the same, and this is true notwithstanding the agency is gratuitous.' " The cross-complaint states a
cause of action.
2.
"Plaintiff's contention that the cause of action fails is further
refuted by its admission that 'possibly part of the testimony of the
defendant' was competent, i. e., fit and appropriate to establish the
proof of the issue.
There would be no need of proof of any issue if
there was no cause of action."
3.
Evidence examined and found to sustain the preponderance
required in favor of the counterclaim.
"It is not unusual in civil
cases that the testimony of a single creditable witness is sufficient to
prove a fact in issue."
4.
An instruction which leaves to the jury the question of the
construction of the contract as to scope and authority, might be vulnerable to objection; but where it is tempered and limited by appropriate
language in another instruction to the effect that "the plaintiff entered
into the agreement with the defendant as stated in defendant's exhibit
'A', the tenor whereof you will be able to observe," there is no error
in giving the former.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
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ATTACHMENTs-LEVY-REDELIVERY BOND-INTERVENING CREDIT-

ORS-Higgins, et at. vs. Business Men's Collection Bureau-No.
14424-Decided November 7, 1938--County Court of Pueblo
County-Hon. Hubert Glover, Judge-Reversed. IN DEPARTMENT.

FACTS: Judgment was entered against the plaintiffs in error for
$200.00 on a redelivery bond given by the defendant, Higgins, in an
attachment suit pending before a Justice of the Peace. The suit had
been commenced by the defendant in error, as plaintiff. The demand
was settled out of Court and the attachment proceedings were dismissed as to said plaintiff. There had, however, been an intervention
by another creditor who recovered a $300.00 judgment, which was later
assigned to the present defendant in error, the latter being also the first
attaching creditor, whose original demand had been settled. The
intervening creditor made no additional attachment levy. The question involved is whether the intervening creditor's assignee had a right
to sue, as it did, on the undertaking given to it as the original.
HELD:
1. Any subsequent attachment must be actually levied
before a lien thereunder can attach.
2. Inasmuch as the intervener's claim was asserted without levying an attachment in aid thereof, and consequently, no redelivery undertaking was given to it in connection with that claim, the assignee is
without remedy-as the assignor itself would have been--except as
the judgment whLh was assigned can be satisfied by means of an execution properly issued in the usual course.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Knous
concur.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-IMPROVEMENT

DISTRICTS-BONDS-

PAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST-Eisiminger

vs. Elliott,

etc.-No. 14321-Decided November 21, 1938-District Court
of Otero County-Hon. Harry Leddy, Judge-Reversed. EN
BANC.
FACTS:
City of Rocky Ford established improvement District
and issued and sold bonds. As the property holders paid their assessments, the City Treasurer deposited part of the fund in one account out
of which he paid interest on the bond, and deposited part of the funds
in another account out of which he paid the principal, redeeming the
bonds numerically as the funds permitted. Plaintiff, holder of interest
coupons on the bonds seeks to compel treasurer to pay the coupons out
of both accounts on the theory that the obligation for principal and
interest is one and that there is no statute requiring or permitting the
establishment of two accounts.
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1. The bond is the sealed promise of the municipality
HELD:
to pay both principal and interest.
2. The "payment of all bonds" as prescribed by the statute and
ordinance, must be construed as demanding a coincidental discharge of
interest as well as principal and must be given the same effect as if the
words "and interest" had been inserted immediately after the word
"bonds."

3. All the monies of the district received either as principal
assessments or interest thereon should be kept in one fund.
4. The City may call in for redemption, the outstanding bonds
only when no interest, matured and due, on the outstanding bonds is
in default.
5. "If at a time when no sich default exists, there is in the funds
of the district sufficient money to discharge the principal of a bond or
bonds, the City Treasurer may, if he deems it prudent, call a bond or
bonds without consideration of the interest accruing, but not yet due
on the outstanding bonds of the issue, and to this extent anticipate
revenue to meet the interest payment due on the next interest paying
date."
6. "Where, however, defaults of matured interest have occurred,
exercise of the discretion conferred by statute with respect to redemption
of bonds, must be deferred until the defaulted payments have been
liquidated."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.

CRIMINAL

No.

LAW-LARCENY-INSTRUCTIONS-Ruland

vs. People-

14429-Decided Notvember 21, 1938-District Court of

Weld County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Reversed. EN
BANC.
R and others were charged with the larceny of certain
FACTS:
The Court instructed the jury that the possession of stolen
horses.
property recently after the commission of a theft or larceny may be
a criminating circumstance tending to show that the persons in whose

possession it was found are guilty of the offense of larceny, unless the
jury is satisfied from the evidence that the defendants came into the
possession of the property honestly. The trial Court, during the trial,

stated that there was no evidence showing the stolen property to have
been in R's possession.
HELD: 1. While the trial Court's statement as to the evidence
is not conclusive, it is persuasive.
2. Where it appears that there is no evidence of "possession of
stolen property recently after the commission of a theft or larceny," as
contemplated by the instruction, the giving of such an instruction was
prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Holland did not participate.
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DICTA

vs. Estate of Heron-No. 14413
November 7, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon.

WRIT OF ERROR-RECEIVER--Cline

-Decided

Otto Bock, Judge-Writ of Error Dismissed.

EN BANC.

FACTS: This was an ancillary proceeding to Cline vs. Estate
of Heron, No. 14412. It involved the alleged impropriety of the appointment of a receiver during pendency of the case. Receiver appointed to preserve and protect a valuable crop of wheat.
HELD:
1. Even if the appointment had not been suspended,
it would have become functus officio with the disposition of the main
case.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
ticipating.

Mr. Justice Holland not par-

BILLS AND NOTES-WIFE'S LIABILITIES FOR FAMILY EXPENSESSTATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-Wall vs. Crawford, etc.-No. 14402

-Decided

August 8, 1938-District Court of Routt County-

Hon. Charles E. Herrick, Judge-Affirmed. IN DEPARTMENT.
FACTS: Suit brought on promissory note given by W, as maker,
and B as accommodation endorser in 1920 for a team of horses. B had
to pay the note and sued W and W's wife on theory that the team of
horses was a family expense. In an attachment, certain funds coming
to Mrs. W as an heir were garnisheed. She seeks reversal of judgment on
the principal grond that the action is barred by the six-year statute of
limitations.
HELD: I. Where the note was extended from time to time from
1920 to 1924, when the Ws moved to California, and B, the accommodation endorser, was called upon to pay it, B's representative could sue
W and his wife although more than 6 years had elapsed because Sec. 27,
Ch. 102, C. L. 6417 states that the statute shall not begin to run "until
be comes into the State * * *"
2. This so-called "absconding" statute applies in this case although it became effective in 1921, and the original note was executed
in 1920, because of the renewal of the note subsequent to the passage
of the act.
3. The contention of defendant that the time of the liability can-

not be extended by the renewal notes given by her husband, on the theory

that a joint debtor cannot arrest the running of the statute against his
co-debtor by giving a new note without his consent, is not tenable, inasmuch as her liability for family expenses accrues under Sec. 10, Ch. 83,
p. 565, Vol. 3, 1935 C. S. A., and when her husband gave new notes,
he could not and did not discharge her statutory liability.
4. "Since no cause of action accrues on a note until maturity, no
liability on the transaction had been incurred by plaintiff in error at the
time the absconding statute was passed, and, consequently, she became
subject to its provisions."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
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